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DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT v. OSBORNE: LEAVING PRISONERS’ ACCESS
TO DNA EVIDENCE IN LIMBO
ALEXANDRA MILLARD*
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,1
the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether a state
prisoner’s claims for access to the State’s evidence for DNA testing are
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 and whether the prisoner has a
due process right to obtain access to such evidence for testing pur-
poses.3  The Court assumed without deciding that the claims could be
pursued under Section 1983, and held that the State’s post-conviction
procedures did not violate the prisoner’s due process rights.4  In so
holding, the Court concluded that Alaska’s post-conviction review pro-
cedures were adequate on their face and that because the prisoner
had failed to exhaust the procedures, the Court could not assess their
fairness in practice.5  In confining its reasoning to the circumstances
of the case, the Court left the door open to future claims of a similar
nature, and the boundaries of the right to access evidence post-convic-
tion remain undefined.6  The Court should have clarified the right by
deciding the important Section 1983 question and conducting a
meaningful procedural due process assessment of Alaska’s proce-
dures.7  By recognizing Section 1983 as an avenue to bring such claims
and making clear the process due, the Court could have faithfully
Copyright  2010 by Alexandra Millard.
* Alexandra Millard is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author would like to
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sor Sherri Keene for her encouragement and sage advice.  The author is also indebted to
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1. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
3. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316.
4. Id. at 2319, 2321.  The Court went on to reject a free-standing constitutional right
to access DNA evidence under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2322.
5. Id. at 2320–21.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.A–B.
954
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built upon precedent, avoided many of its expressed policy concerns,
and provided both notice to prisoners and guidance to lower courts as
the rapidly growing area of DNA technology continues to develop.8
I. THE CASE
In March 1993, a female prostitute (“K.G.”) was attacked by two
men in an isolated area of Anchorage, Alaska.9  The men had invited
her into the driver’s car when she agreed to perform fellatio on them
in exchange for $100.10  They then drove her to a secluded area and
forced her to perform fellatio on the driver while the passenger pene-
trated her vaginally.11  Afterward, the men instructed K.G. to leave the
car, and upon her refusal the driver hit K.G. in the head with a gun,
and the passenger proceeded to choke her.12  K.G. tried to flee from
the two men, but they beat her with an axe handle.13  Lying in the
snow, she pretended to be dead, but one of her attackers fired a bullet
that grazed her head.14  The men then covered K.G. with snow and
drove away.15  K.G. made her way to the main road and flagged down
a car, telling the people inside what had happened and asking for a
ride home.16  Law enforcement learned about the attack through a
neighbor of one of K.G.’s rescuers and contacted K.G.17  Although
reluctant at first, K.G. eventually agreed to describe the events and
submit to a physical examination.18  Among the items the police
found at the crime scene were a used blue condom and two pairs of
K.G.’s pants stained with blood.19
The following week, military police apprehended Dexter Jackson
for a traffic violation and found a pistol and pocketknife in his car.20
The police arrested him upon discovering that Jackson and his car
resembled the man and vehicle described in connection with K.G.’s
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1122
(9th Cir. 2008).
10. Osborne v. State, 163 P.3d 973, 975 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
11. Osborne, 521 F.3d at 1122.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.  She believed, based on the pants and footwear she witnessed, that it was the
passenger of the car who shot at her. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1123.
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assault.21  Jackson then told the Anchorage Police that William Os-
borne had been his accomplice on the night of the attack.22  K.G.
identified Jackson and Osborne from a series of photographs.23  Bal-
listics connected the shell casing discovered at the crime scene to Jack-
son’s pistol.24  When sperm from the used condom were tested using
DQ Alpha DNA technology, the results excluded Jackson and showed
that the sperm were of the same DQ Alpha type as Osborne.25
A. State Court Proceedings
Osborne was charged with kidnapping, assault, sexual assault,
and attempted murder.26  He was tried before a jury and convicted of
kidnapping, first-degree assault, and two counts of first-degree sexual
assault.27  The trial judge sentenced him to twenty-six years in prison
with five years suspended.28  On appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals
affirmed Osborne’s conviction, rejecting his claim of insufficient evi-
dence and other challenges.29  Osborne then sought post-conviction
relief in the Alaska Superior Court, asserting that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to pursue Restriction Fragment Length Polymor-
phism (“RFLP”) testing, a potentially more effective type of DNA test-
ing available at the time, and that Osborne had a due process right to
have evidence retested using methods developed after trial.30  When
the Superior Court denied his application, he appealed that decision
to the Alaska Court of Appeals.31  With those actions pending, Os-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.  K.G. also identified Jackson’s car and the pocketknife found inside it. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.  DQ Alpha testing reveals the alleles that occupy an individual genetic locus on a
gene strand. Id.  A more discriminating DNA testing method known as “RFLP” was availa-
ble pre-trial, but was not conducted based on the State crime lab’s decision that the sample
was too degraded and defense counsel’s judgment that additional testing would further
incriminate the defendant. Id. at 1123–24.  Pubic hairs recovered from the crime scene
were not amenable to DQ Alpha testing, but under microscopic analysis were found to be
consistent with having come from Osborne.  Id. at 1124.
26. Jackson v. State, Nos. A-5276, A-5329, 1996 WL 33686444, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App.
Feb. 7, 1996).  Jackson was charged with kidnapping, assault, sexual assault, attempted
murder, and solicitation to commit murder. Id.
27. Osborne, 521 F.3d at 1124.  Osborne presented alibi and mistaken identity defenses,
pointing out K.G.’s poor vision and details in her identification that did not fit his descrip-
tion. Id.  The jury rejected those defenses.  Id.
28. Jackson, 1996 WL 33686444, at *3.  Jackson was convicted of kidnapping, first-de-
gree sexual assault, first-degree assault, and third-degree assault, and received a composite
sentence of twenty-seven years with five years suspended. Id.
29. Id. at *7–8.
30. Osborne, 521 F.3d at 1124.
31. Id.
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borne applied for parole, confessing in his written application and at
his hearing before the Parole Board to participating in the attack on
K.G.32  The Board denied his application for parole.33
The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed in part and remanded in
part the Superior Court’s dismissal of Osborne’s petition for post-con-
viction relief.34  The court first rejected Osborne’s ineffective assis-
tance claim, concluding that his counsel’s decision not to pursue
more discriminating DNA testing fell within the acceptable standards
of attorney competence.35  In examining Osborne’s due process
claim, the court applied Alaska’s post-conviction relief statute, which
provides that defendants may be able to use clear and convincing evi-
dence to prove their innocence if (1) the evidence is newly discovered
and (2) the defendant exercises due diligence in presenting his or her
claim.36  The court determined that Osborne did not meet the statu-
tory restrictions because the physical evidence in his case was not
newly discovered, the DNA testing that Osborne sought existed at the
time of trial, and Osborne’s counsel consciously chose not to seek
more precise testing.37
The court, however, chose instead to adopt a three-part test, ap-
plied by several other states, in examining Osborne’s request for post-
conviction DNA testing.38  Under this test, a defendant must demon-
strate “(1) that the conviction rested primarily on eye-witness identifi-
cation evidence; (2) that there was a demonstrable doubt concerning
the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator; and (3) that scien-
tific testing would likely be conclusive on this issue.”39  The court thus
remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine whether Os-
borne could satisfy this test and whether his claim was procedurally
disqualified under state law.40  The Superior Court held that Osborne
failed to satisfy the three-part test and denied his petition for DNA
testing.41  The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Alaska Su-
preme Court denied Osborne’s subsequent petition for review.42
32. Id. at 1125.
33. Id.
34. Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 987–88, 995 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
35. Id. at 991–92.
36. Id. at 995; ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2) (2008).
37. Osborne, 110 P.3d at 992.
38. Id. at 995.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1125
(9th Cir. 2008).
42. Id.
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B. Federal Court Proceedings
After the Alaska Superior Court denied his application for post-
conviction relief, Osborne filed suit in federal district court under Sec-
tion 1983, alleging that the Anchorage District Attorney’s Office, the
District Attorney, the Anchorage Police Department, and the Chief of
Police violated his constitutional rights by denying him post-convic-
tion access to evidence for DNA testing.43  His claims included alleged
violations of (1) “his due process right to access exculpatory evi-
dence,” (2) “his due process right to demonstrate actual innocence,”
and (3) “his due process and equal protection rights to meaningful
access to the courts.”44  The district court dismissed the suit.45  On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.46  While the dis-
trict court held that dismissal was required under Heck v.
Humphrey47—a case establishing that a claim seeking to attack a con-
viction must proceed through a writ of habeas corpus48—the Ninth
Circuit found that Heck did not preclude a suit seeking to compel re-
lease of biological evidence for DNA testing under Section 1983 be-
cause it was not certain that the suit would invalidate the conviction
even if the suit proved successful.49  The Ninth Circuit then remanded
to the district court to determine whether Osborne had been de-
prived of a federally protected right.50  The district court found in
Osborne’s favor, holding that under the circumstances there existed a
“limited constitutional right to the testing sought.”51  The Ninth Cir-
cuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo and affirmed.52  The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Os-
borne’s claims could be pursued under Section 1983 and whether he
had a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
43. Id. at 1126.
44. Id.  Osborne also alleged an Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process,
and a right to a fair clemency hearing. Id.
45. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1052
(9th Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 1056.
47. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
48. Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1051 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 489).
49. Id. at 1055–56.
50. Id. at 1056.
51. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079,
1081 (D. Alaska 2006).
52. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1128,
1142 (9th Cir. 2008).
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ment to post-conviction access to the State’s evidence for purposes of
DNA testing.53
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews state post-convic-
tion procedures deferentially, recognizing that the procedures are dis-
cretionary and serve as the traditional avenue for a challenge to a state
court conviction.54  The Court has held that a prisoner has a liberty
interest in effective access to state procedures, where they are pro-
vided, and that a prisoner may challenge those procedures in federal
court.55  While the Court thus recognizes a prisoner’s right to chal-
lenge state post-conviction procedures in federal court, it places limits
upon this right in order to protect interests in comity, federalism, and
finality—claims that implicate these concerns must be brought under
a writ of habeas corpus, while those that do not can be brought under
Section 1983.56  In determining what process is due in claims properly
brought, the Court’s standard of review has varied depending on the
nature of the claim and whether it is based on a liberty interest deriv-
ing from flexible state procedures, or a liberty interest derived from
more formal state rules of criminal procedure.57
A. The Court Recognizes a Prisoner’s Liberty Interest in Access to State
Post-Conviction Procedures, Where They Are Provided
The Court has established that a state prisoner has a liberty inter-
est protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which may arise from the word “liberty” in that text, or
from the expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.58
Precedent has long maintained that a prisoner loses the presumption
53. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316
(2009).
54. See infra Part II.A–B.
55. See infra Part II.A.
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. See infra Part II.C.
58. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“A liberty interest may arise
from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty’ . . . .”);
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (noting that if a State has created appellate courts
as “‘an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a
defendant,’” the procedures used in deciding appeals must not violate the Due Process
Clause (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956))); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974) (holding that the State, in providing a right to good-time credit, created a
liberty interest).
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of innocence after conviction at a fair trial,59 and his liberty interest,
though retained under the Fourteenth Amendment,60 is limited
thereafter.61  That limited interest can be vindicated through a State’s
post-conviction procedures.62  While a State has discretion as to
whether to provide such procedures, where it does, a prisoner has a
liberty interest in access.63  In those instances, a State’s post-conviction
procedures must comport with due process.64
Pre-conviction, liberty interests often take the form of a due pro-
cess right to procedures sufficient to vindicate constitutional rights.65
Post-conviction, a liberty interest may be asserted either by petitioning
for a writ of habeas corpus or by filing a civil claim under Sec-
tion 1983.66  Habeas corpus is the only remedy by which petitioners
may challenge the fact or duration of confinement or seek immediate
or quicker release.67  Section 1983 is a means of civil redress for the
violation of federal rights by way of damages or injunctive relief.68
59. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (“Once a defendant has been af-
forded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption
of innocence disappears.”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)
(“‘[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of
his liberty.’” (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979))).
60. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (“[T]he State having created the right to good time
[credit] and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major mis-
conduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within
Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-
created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”).
61. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (holding that when a State chooses
to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions, due process does not dictate the
precise form such assistance must assume).
62. See, e.g., Austin, 545 U.S. at 209, 230 (upholding a state policy for placing inmates in
supermax prisons); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554–55 (finding that actual restoration of good-time
credits could not be ordered, but that a declaratory judgment with respect to procedures
for imposing a loss of good-time credits would not be barred).
63. See infra Part II.C.
64. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985).  There is, however, no liberty interest in
mere process.  Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 279–80 n.2 (1998).
Rather, the state process serves the prisoner’s underlying substantive right.  Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 315 n.5 (4th Cir.
2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Olim, 461 U.S. at
249–50).
65. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding that prosecutors have
an obligation to seek justice for their defendants, including a duty to disclose material,
favorable evidence for use at the defendant’s trial).
66. See infra Part II.B.
67. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 488–90 (1973)).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Though the Court has recognized a due process right to vindicate
a liberty interest created by a State’s post-conviction procedures
brought via habeas corpus, the Court has imposed limits on such a
right.69  In Darr v. Burford,70 when a state prisoner sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court for release from a bank robbery convic-
tion, the Court articulated the narrow path by which a habeas peti-
tioner can challenge state proceedings in federal court.71  The Court
emphasized that a petitioner must exhaust state remedies before pur-
suing federal habeas relief, unless the circumstances render the state
corrective process ineffective to protect the prisoner’s rights.72  In
Morrissey v. Brewer,73 when state prisoners challenged the revocation of
their parole under the writ, the Court concluded that whether any
procedural protections are due depends not on whether a govern-
ment benefit is defined as a “right” or “privilege,”74 but whether the
individual will be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.”75  It stated that
the question is not only the weight of the individual’s interest, but
whether the nature of the interest falls within the “liberty or property”
language of the Fourteenth Amendment.76  In Evitts v. Lucey,77 a pris-
oner claimed a right to effective counsel on an appeal that was pro-
vided by the State as a matter of right.78  The purpose of the appeal
69. See, e.g., Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204–07, 210 (1950) (explaining the rule that
a habeas petitioner must generally first exhaust state remedies).
70. 339 U.S. 200.
71. Id. at 201–04.  The Court stated the requirement that a petition for review of the
state denial of habeas corpus be made first in the Supreme Court, explaining:
This Court has evolved a procedure which assures an examination into the sub-
stance of a prisoner’s protest against unconstitutional detention without allowing
destructive abuse of the precious guaranty of the Great Writ.  Congress has specif-
ically approved it.  Though a refusal of certiorari have no effect upon a later ap-
plication for federal habeas corpus, a petition for certiorari here ordinarily
should be required.
Id. at 216.
72. Id. at 204–05, 210.  In Darr, the Court explained the policy reasons for this require-
ment, observing that the State should have the opportunity to pass on the matter. Id. at
204.  According to the Court, “[t]he petitioner has the burden . . . of showing that other
available remedies have been exhausted or that circumstances of peculiar urgency exist.”
Id. at 218–19.
73. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
74. Id. at 474, 481 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)).
75. Id. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing
that “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law”).
77. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
78. Id. at 390.
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was to determine whether the prisoner had been lawfully convicted.79
The Court held that the defendant was entitled to effective assistance
of counsel as a matter of right, finding that “when a State opts to act in
a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must
nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution.”80  In
Herrera v. Collins,81 the Court denied a habeas petitioner’s claims that
he should be able to present new evidence despite exceeding Texas’s
thirty-day time limit for filing new trial motions.82  The Court stated
that habeas review is traditionally limited to claims of underlying con-
stitutional violations, as habeas courts do not exist to serve as finders
of fact.83
A liberty interest in state post-conviction procedures can also be
brought under Section 1983.  In Wolff v. McDonnell,84 the Court found
that the Section 1983 petitioners were entitled to a declaratory judg-
ment with regard to the restoration of their good-time credits, hold-
ing that where the State had created a right to such credits, the
prisoner had a liberty interest in such rights not being arbitrarily abro-
gated.85  In Wilkinson v. Austin,86 Section 1983 petitioners sued over a
state policy governing placement in the State’s “supermax prison.”87
The Court recognized the prisoners’ liberty interests in avoiding as-
signment to the prison, but found that the state procedure was ade-
quate because the prisoners received notice, an opportunity for
rebuttal, and review.88
B. In Challenging State Post-Conviction Procedures, a Prisoner Who
Challenges the Fact of Her Conviction Must Proceed by a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, While a Prisoner Challenging the
Conditions of Her Confinement May Proceed Under
Section 1983
While the Court recognizes a prisoner’s right to challenge state
post-conviction procedures in federal court, it places limits upon this
79. Id. at 390–92.
80. Id. at 401.
81. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
82. Id. at 404–07.
83. Id. at 400, 416–17 (“[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”).
84. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
85. Id. at 555, 557.
86. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
87. Id. at 213, 218.  Supermax institutions are “maximum-security prisons with highly
restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the gen-
eral prison population.” Id. at 213.
88. Id. at 225–28.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-4\MLR404.txt unknown Seq: 10 25-AUG-10 9:44
2010] DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE V. OSBORNE 963
right in order to protect the interest in comity.89  The Court has held
that a state prisoner who challenges the fact of her conviction must
proceed by a writ of habeas corpus, while a state prisoner challenging
the conditions of her confinement may proceed under Sec-
tion 1983.90  Because proceeding under habeas requires a prisoner to
first exhaust state remedies, the Court’s requirement that a prisoner
who wishes to invalidate her conviction proceed under habeas ensures
that a federal court will not invalidate a state court conviction until
the state court has had an opportunity to pass on the matter.91  Since
challenges to the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement do not nec-
essarily implicate the overturning of a state court conviction, the
Court has stated that such claims may be brought under the less strin-
gent avenue of Section 1983 without exhausting state procedures.92
While the Supreme Court has clearly held that Section 1983 is an
improper vehicle for claims seeking to invalidate a conviction,93 the
Court has not announced whether a claim to access DNA post-convic-
tion falls within that class of claims.  Several federal circuit courts of
appeals have split on the issue, with the most recent decisions holding
that such a claim would be cognizable under Section 1983.94
1. Section 1983 as an Improper Vehicle for Claims to Invalidate a
Conviction Under Preiser and Heck
In order to file a lawsuit under Section 1983, a petitioner must
allege two things: (1) that the defendant deprived her of a federal
constitutional right, and (2) that the defendant acted under color of
state law in so doing.95  In Preiser v. Rodriguez,96 where state prisoners
89. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (explaining that “habeas
corpus actions require a petitioner fully to exhaust state remedies, which § 1983 does not”
and that “considerations of linguistic specificity, history, and comity led the Court to find
an implicit exception from § 1983’s otherwise broad scope for actions that lie ‘within the
core of habeas corpus’” (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973))); Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1950) (“Since habeas corpus is a discretionary writ, federal
courts had authority to refuse relief as a matter of comity until state remedies were ex-
hausted.  Through this comity, the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies has
developed . . . .”).
90. Compare Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486–89 (holding that the writ of habeas corpus serves as
the proper instrument to seek release from unlawful confinement, rather than § 1983),
with Dotson, 544 U.S. at 82 (holding that prisoners challenging the constitutionality of state
parole procedures may proceed under § 1983).
91. Darr, 339 U.S. at 204.
92. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81–82.
93. See infra Part II.B.1.
94. See infra Part II.B.2.
95. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
96. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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sought injunctive relief to compel restoration of good-conduct-time
credits that would result in their immediate release, the Court estab-
lished that Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or dura-
tion of confinement.97  Rather, Section 1983 provides a separate
vehicle for a prisoner seeking to challenge the conditions of her con-
finement.98  The Court further explained in Heck v. Humphrey99 that a
state prisoner cannot use Section 1983 to pursue a claim that would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s sentence or
conviction.100
2. Dotson and the Circuit Split with Regard to Accessing DNA Post-
Conviction
While the Supreme Court has not reached the issue of access to
DNA evidence post-conviction under Section 1983, the federal circuit
courts of appeals that have reached the question are split.  Following
the Preiser and Heck decisions, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits each held that a suit seeking post-
conviction access to evidence for DNA testing to challenge a convic-
tion is not cognizable under Section 1983 because such a lawsuit is
tantamount to a direct attack on the conviction.101  In contrast, the
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Sec-
tion 1983 may be the appropriate vehicle for such a claim, although
the petition for release must be pursued in a separate habeas corpus
suit.102  At least two district courts have fallen in line with this latter set
of circuits.103
97. Id. at 476–77, 490.
98. Id. at 499.
99. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
100. Id. at 481–82.  In Heck, an inmate sought damages under § 1983 for allegedly un-
lawful acts that he claimed led to his arrest and conviction. Id. at 478–79.  The Court held
that the suit was properly dismissed because the damages claims challenged the legality of
his conviction, and such a suit could not be brought under § 1983. Id. at 489–90.
101. See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 372–73 (4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery
County, 303 F.3d 339, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2002); Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App’x 340, 340–41 (6th
Cir. 2002).
102. See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v. Lyons, 469
F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.
2002).
103. See Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237–38 (D. Mass. 2006); Derrickson v. Del.
County Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 04-1569, 2006 WL 2135854, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. July 26,
2006).
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The decisions of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits104 were
likely a reaction to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wilkinson v. Dot-
son,105 where the Court held that prisoners’ claims challenging their
parole denials were cognizable under Section 1983.106  In Dotson, pris-
oners sought declaratory and injunctive relief when they challenged
the constitutionality of state parole procedures.107  The Court held
that a challenge to the procedures used in parole-eligibility hearings is
cognizable under Section 1983 because a violation would lead to a
new parole hearing, rather than earlier release from custody.108  The
Dotson Court clarified that a prisoner’s Section 1983 suit would not be
barred if the outcome of the suit would not necessarily lead to the
prisoner’s release.109  Even if the prisoner’s suit would put him in a
better position to launch future attacks on his conviction or sentence,
he could proceed under Section 1983.110  The Second, Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have stressed that a prisoner’s Sec-
tion 1983 suit seeking access to DNA evidence would comport with
Preiser and its progeny in that the success of the action would not nec-
essarily invalidate the prisoner’s conviction—the evidence could be
inculpatory or exculpatory—and the suit to access the evidence could
at most supply the evidence.111
C. The Court Uses the Medina Test, Rather Than the Mathews Test,
to Review Claims Based on State Rules of Criminal Procedure
In addition to recognizing and placing limits on a prisoner’s due
process right to vindicate a liberty interest created by state post-convic-
tion procedures, the Court uses different standards in reviewing such
claims depending upon the nature of claim being brought.112  The
104. The Eleventh Circuit case Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, was decided in 2002, and
was not influenced by Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), which was decided in 2005.
105. 544 U.S. 74.
106. Id. at 82.
107. Id. at 76.
108. Id. at 82.
109. Id. at 81–82.
110. See id. at 82 (explaining that success under § 1983 could result in a new parole
hearing or consideration of a new parole application).
111. See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v. Lyons, 469
F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2005); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290–91
(11th Cir. 2002).
112. See McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that a
deferential standard prescribed in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992), is used to
review rules of criminal procedure, while a balancing-of-interests approach derived from
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), is applied in most other contexts).
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Court’s choice of standard seeks to strike a balance between concerns
of federalism, comity, finality, and truth-seeking and justice.113
For claims based on a liberty interest deriving from state post-
conviction policies, the Court uses a balancing test that evolved over
the course of several decisions prior to the establishment of the test in
the 1976 civil case Mathews v. Eldridge.114  Four years before Mathews,
the Court applied a version of the test in Morrissey v. Brewer,115 where
habeas petitioners sought release following revocation of parole with-
out a hearing.116  In deciding the minimal due process requirements
for parole revocation, the Court explained that “due process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands.”117  Where the claim involves revocation of parole, a
process arising after the end of the criminal prosecution and super-
vised by an administrative agency, less than the full panoply of rights
due in a criminal prosecution would apply—considerations should in-
clude the nature of the government function involved and the private
interest affected by governmental action.118
Two years later, in Wolff v. McDonnell,119 the Court applied a simi-
lar balancing test in a Section 1983 suit for restoration of good-time
credits.120  The Court explained that even though the discovery proce-
dure is normally part of the criminal prosecution, the prisoner in this
situation was not entitled to the full panoply of rights, as there must
be a mutual accommodation between the institution’s needs and the
prisoner’s interests.121
In Mathews, a person whose social security benefits had been ter-
minated challenged the constitutionality of the federal administrative
procedures used for assessing whether a disability exists.122  The
Court, in holding that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior
to the termination of such benefits and that the procedures were law-
ful, outlined a standard for due process challenges that takes into con-
sideration: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action,
(2) the risk of erroneously depriving such interest and the likely value
113. See, e.g., Medina, 505 U.S. at 443–45 (discussing the policy reasons underlying its
standard, including judicial fairness and federalism); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (evaluating
the constitutionality of state procedures by weighing private and governmental interests).
114. 424 U.S. 319.
115. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
116. Id. at 472–74.
117. Id. at 481.
118. Id. at 480–81.
119. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
120. Id. at 560.
121. Id. at 556, 566.
122. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1976).
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of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s inter-
est in light of the function involved and fiscal administrative demands
that additional procedural requirements would require.123  Following
the Mathews decision, the Court in Wilkinson v. Austin held that the
Mathews test is adequate to evaluate the sufficiency of particular proce-
dures post-conviction.124
For claims based on a liberty interest derived from state rules of
criminal procedure, the Court applies the deferential standard
presented in Medina v. California.125  The Court articulated a variation
of the standard five years prior to Medina in Pennsylvania v. Finley.126
In Finley, the Court denied a petitioner’s due process claim for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel post-conviction, finding that, considering the
source of the prisoner’s right and the nature of the proceedings, the
prisoner’s appointed counsel did not violate the “fundamental fair-
ness exacted by the Due Process Clause.”127  In Medina, when the peti-
tioner challenged a statute allocating the burden of proof in a
criminal proceeding, the Court upheld the statute, declaring that
state legislative judgments are entitled to substantial deference in the
area of criminal procedure, and that the criminal process will be
found lacking only where “‘it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.’”128  The Court also considered whether the proce-
dure in question “transgress[ed] any recognized principle of funda-
mental fairness in operation,”129 but found that it did not.  The Court
explained that “because the States have considerable expertise in mat-
ters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in
centuries of common-law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise sub-
stantial deference to legislative judgments in this area.”130
Following the decision in Medina, the Court applied its funda-
mental fairness test in Herrera v. Collins,131 finding that Texas’s time
limit for filing new trial motions did not violate the petitioner’s due
process rights in light of the Constitution’s silence on the subject of
123. Id. at 335, 349.
124. 545 U.S. 209, 228–29 (2005) (explaining that informal and nonadversary proce-
dures satisfy the Mathews test).
125. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
126. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
127. Id. at 555–56.
128. Medina, 505 U.S. at 442, 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)).
129. Id. at 442, 448 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 445–46.
131. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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new trials, the historical availability of new trials based on newly dis-
covered evidence, a federal criminal procedure rule establishing a
time limit for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evi-
dence, and the fact that only nine states did not have time limits for
filing such motions.132  The Court explained that federal courts may
upset state post-conviction procedures only if they are inadequate to
vindicate some fundamental right, thus violating traditional principles
of justice.133
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,134
the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, hold-
ing that the prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence an-
nounced in Brady v. Maryland135 does not apply in the post-conviction
context and that Alaska’s law governing procedures for post-convic-
tion relief did not violate Osborne’s due process rights.136
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts began by explain-
ing that the Federal Government and the States have developed meth-
ods, usually through legislation, to ensure that DNA testing is properly
incorporated into criminal procedure so that it can be utilized to ex-
onerate the innocent without leading to the collapse of the criminal
justice system.137  The Court explained that a number of features are
commonly found in both federal and state legislation, including a
demonstration of materiality, a sworn statement that the applicant is
innocent, and diligence requirements such as showing that the testing
was impossible at trial or that the defendant did not decline testing at
trial for tactical reasons.138  In Alaska, where legislation specific to the
issue has not yet been enacted, state courts are addressing how to ap-
ply existing laws to DNA testing.139
To determine the validity of Osborne’s claim that he was entitled
to access DNA samples, the Court confronted the questions of
whether the suit was properly brought under Section 1983, whether
Alaska’s post-conviction relief procedures violated Osborne’s due pro-
cess rights, whether Osborne could claim a federal constitutional right
132. Id. at 407–11.
133. Id. at 407–08.
134. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
135. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
136. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2315–16, 2319–20, 2323.
137. Id. at 2316.
138. Id. at 2317.
139. Id.
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to be released upon proof of actual innocence, and whether Osborne
could claim a substantive due process right to DNA evidence separate
from his liberty interest.140
The Court first stated that although it granted certiorari on the
issue of whether Section 1983 is a valid route for Osborne’s action, it
need not resolve the issue in order to rule on Osborne’s claims.141
The Court thus assumed without deciding that Heck v. Humphrey142
did not bar Osborne’s suit.143
In examining whether Alaska’s post-conviction relief procedures
violated Osborne’s due process rights, the Court began by dismissing
Osborne’s claim that he could rely on the Governor’s constitutional
authority to grant clemency, clarifying that noncapital defendants do
not have a liberty interest in state executive clemency.144
The Court found that Osborne does have a liberty interest in
showing his innocence under Alaska law, however.145  The Court rea-
soned that Brady did not govern the case, as the Court of Appeals had
suggested, because a defendant does not have the same rights post-
conviction as he had before and during trial, and is no longer pre-
sumed innocent.146  Nevertheless, a defendant may have a limited lib-
erty interest post-conviction.147  The relevant rule, according to the
Court, is one derived from Medina v. California148: “Federal courts may
upset a State’s postconviction relief procedures only if they are funda-
mentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided.”149
Applying the rule to the facts of the case, the Court examined Alaska’s
law, which provides that defendants who use new evidence to prove
their innocence by clear and convincing evidence may obtain vacation
of their conviction or sentence and may also obtain possible rights to
procedures vital to the realization of that right.150  Although these
rights are qualified by certain requirements, namely that the evidence
140. Id. at 2316, 2321–22.
141. Id. at 2319.
142. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
143. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2319–20.
147. See id. at 2320 (explaining that even though Brady does not apply, the State’s proce-
dures still must be scrutinized).
148. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
149. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (interpreting the rule set forth in Medina, 505 U.S. at
446, 448).
150. Id. at 2319; ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2) (2008).  The right to be released from
confinement, the Court added, is exempt from normally applicable time limits, and Alaska
has discovery procedures governing access to DNA evidence. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320.
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must be newly available, must have been diligently pursued before
trial, and must be sufficiently material, the Court decided that they
are not inconsistent with the Medina rule.151  In addition, the Court
noted that the Alaska Court of Appeals suggested that the state consti-
tution provides a separate right of access to DNA evidence for those
who cannot satisfy the aforementioned statutory requirements, by in-
voking the three-part test used by other states.152  In light of these
procedures available to Osborne, the Court held that Alaska’s post-
conviction relief procedures were adequate, adding that Osborne had
not used the process provided to him by the State and thus had not
met his burden of showing how the procedures are inadequate.153
Finally, to determine whether Osborne could claim a freestand-
ing, substantive due process right to DNA evidence separate from his
liberty interest, the Court looked to the implications such a right
would have.154  Noting the problems associated with expanding the
concept of substantive due process, the Court stated that “[t]here is
no long history of such a right,” and pointed out that the establish-
ment of such a right would disrupt the ongoing work of states in the
process of developing legislation to deal with the issue.155  Moreover,
the Court explained that constitutionalizing a right to DNA access
would lead to questions best answered by state courts and legisla-
tures.156  The Court added that such a right would also raise a host of
troublesome policy implications, including whether there is an obliga-
tion to preserve forensic evidence and the difficulties inherent in such
preservation.157  The Court thus held that under the circumstances of
the case, Alaska’s law governing procedures for post-conviction relief
did not violate Osborne’s due process rights.158
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ken-
nedy joined and Justice Thomas joined in part, asserting that two ad-
ditional grounds existed for rejecting Osborne’s constitutional
151. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320–21.
152. Id. at 2321; see supra text accompanying notes 38–39 (describing the three-part R
test).
153. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320–21.  In response to Osborne’s claim to a federal constitu-
tional right to be released upon proof of actual innocence, the Court declined to decide
the issue but proceeded on the assumption that the right exists.  Id. at 2321–22.  The Court
stated that such a claim would be brought in habeas, and that under federal procedural
rules, discovery would only be permitted for good cause. Id.  The Court reiterated that
Osborne could not show that the procedures available to him were inadequate. Id.
154. Id. at 2322.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2323.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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claim.159  First, according to Justice Alito, a state prisoner claiming a
federal constitutional right to access state evidence must exhaust state
remedies, and thus must proceed by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus rather than a Section 1983 claim.160  This is particularly
true, he explained, because Osborne sought access to “exculpatory ev-
idence” that would, by definition, undermine his conviction, and such
claims must be brought in habeas under Heck.161  Second, Justice Alito
asserted, a defendant who forgoes DNA testing at trial for tactical rea-
sons does not have a constitutional right to perform such testing post-
conviction because such a right would spur defendants to engage in
strategic trickery.162  Justice Alito also disagreed with Justice Stevens’s
dissenting argument that the State would have nothing to lose by al-
lowing the testing, explaining that DNA testing often fails to provide
absolute proof, evidence can be contaminated, and the costs associ-
ated with collecting and preserving such evidence can be burden-
some.163  According to Justice Alito, a prisoner should challenge the
State’s procedures under the habeas statute, which “accounts for the
interests of federalism, comity, and finality.”164
In a dissent joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, and in part by
Justice Souter, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s holding
that Osborne failed to demonstrate his right of access to the DNA
evidence.165  As Justice Stevens explained, Osborne claimed that the
DNA results would qualify as new evidence under the meaning of
Alaska’s statutory procedure, but the testing results could not be ob-
tained without first gaining access to the DNA evidence in state cus-
tody.166  Thus, Justice Stevens argued, the State’s procedures did not
provide Osborne with a fair opportunity to assert his state-created
rights and, as such, did not meet the requirements of due process
under the Medina standard.167
Justice Stevens also pointed out that the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals’s conclusion that the testing Osborne requested had been availa-
159. Id. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring).
160. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006)).
161. Id. at 2325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 2324–25 (“The rules set forth in our cases . . . would mean very little if state
prisoners could simply evade them through artful pleading. . . .  [U]nder respondent’s
view, I see no reason why a Brady claimant could not bypass the state courts and file a
§ 1983 claim in federal court, contending that he has a due process right to search the
State’s files for exculpatory evidence.”).
163. Id. at 2327–28.
164. Id. at 2330–31.
165. Id. at 2331–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010(4) (2008)).
167. Id. at 2332 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)).
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ble at the time of trial was incorrect, since Osborne requested Short
Tandem Repeat (“STR”) DNA testing, which was not yet in use at the
time of trial.168  Further, Justice Stevens criticized the state trial court’s
application of the three-part test,169 asserting that the first two prongs
are essentially balancing tests that should be satisfied by the power of
exculpatory DNA evidence, and that the third, whether testing would
be conclusive of guilt or innocence, should also be met, particularly in
light of the State’s concession in that regard.170  For these reasons,
Justice Stevens contended that Osborne properly availed himself of all
possible avenues for relief in state court.171  Because he found that
Osborne had exhausted his options in the state courts and that the
government action so lacked justification that it could be described as
“‘arbitrary, or conscience shocking,’” Justice Stevens felt that Osborne
had adequately demonstrated his entitlement to the State’s evidence
and that the State’s refusal to provide him access to the evidence vio-
lated due process.172
In a separate dissent, Justice Souter argued that Alaska’s proce-
dure for vindicating the liberty interest in demonstrating innocence,
recognized by state law, did not comport with the Due Process
Clause.173  Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Souter would not have de-
cided whether due process required the recognition of a substantive
right of access to evidence for DNA testing, reasoning that Osborne’s
claim could be addressed by procedural due process.174  He agreed
with Justice Stevens that the State failed to provide Osborne with ef-
fective post-conviction relief procedures, finding that Osborne in-
tended to bring new evidence as required by the statute, and that he
could not have previously claimed factual innocence, also required by
the statute, if he wanted to get parole.175  This failure, Justice Souter
contended, was enough to justify a Section 1983 remedy and relief in
this case.176
168. Id. at 2333.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39 (explaining the test). R
170. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2333.
171. Id.  Moreover, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have recognized a lim-
ited federal right to DNA evidence; he noted that the same concerns that led to the Brady
rule, which established an accused’s right of access to evidence during trial, exist in the
post-conviction context. Id. at 2335.  Such a right serves the interest of truth and comes at
little cost to the State. Id. at 2336.
172. Id. at 2333, 2336 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128
(1992)).
173. Id. at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985)).
175. Id. at 2342–43.
176. Id. at 2342.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, the
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that a state prisoner’s claim
to a due process right to access evidence could be pursued under Sec-
tion 1983, and held that the State’s post-conviction procedures did
not violate the prisoner’s due process rights.177  It appears that the
Court declined to criticize the way the procedures worked in practice
for two reasons.  First, it accepted the State’s erroneous finding that
Osborne had not sought a form of testing that had been unavailable
at his trial, as required by the state post-conviction statute, and found
that Osborne thus failed to fulfill a procedural predicate for relief.178
Second, the Court concluded that Osborne failed to demonstrate that
the post-conviction procedures were inadequate in practice, despite
the fact that a Section 1983 claimant is not required to exhaust state
procedures.179
By declining to decide the Section 1983 question, the Court left
prisoners and courts to wonder whether claims to access DNA evi-
dence may properly be brought under the statute.180  Further, by
evading a due process analysis of the State’s post-conviction proce-
dures based on two faulty predicates, the Court failed to protect pris-
oners’ due process rights.181  The Court could have defined the right
to access such evidence and remained consistent with precedent by
deciding the Section 1983 question and conducting a warranted due
process review of Alaska’s post-conviction procedures.182
A. The Court Should Have Recognized Section 1983 as an Avenue to
Seek Post-Conviction Access to Evidence for DNA Testing
In assuming that Osborne’s Section 1983 due process claim for
access to evidence for DNA testing was cognizable, the Osborne Court
missed an opportunity to decide an important issue.  The Court could
have established the logical extension of Preiser v. Rodriguez,183 Heck v.
Humphrey,184 and Wilkinson v. Dotson185 recognized by the Second, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits186 and rejected the State’s argument that Dot-
177. Id. at 2319, 2321 (majority opinion).
178. Id. at 2321.
179. Id.
180. See infra Part IV.A, C.
181. See infra Part IV.B–C.
182. See infra Part IV.C.
183. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
184. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
185. 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
186. See supra Part II.B.
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son did not apply in Osborne’s case.187  Doing so would not have
violated the policies underlying the Preiser and Heck decisions.  While
the State argued that “[s]tripped to its essence . . . Osborne’s [Sec-
tion] 1983 action is nothing more than a request for evidence to sup-
port a hypothetical claim that he is actually innocent[, which] sounds
at the core of habeas corpus,”188 Osborne argued that allowing him
access to the evidence would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction, since even if the DNA testing exonerated him, he would
have to bring a separate suit or petition for clemency to achieve rever-
sal of the conviction.189  Had the Court accepted Osborne’s claim, it
would have comported with Preiser,190 as Osborne’s claim for access to
evidence cannot be characterized as a direct attack on his conviction,
but more closely resembles a challenge to the conditions of his con-
finement; even if the evidence, once tested, proved to be exculpatory,
the suit could at most supply the evidence, and Osborne would still
need to bring a separate suit or petition for clemency to invalidate his
conviction.191  His claim thus complies with Heck, where the Court
held that a state prisoner cannot use Section 1983 to pursue a claim
that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s sentence
or conviction.192
In addition, the Court recognized that “[e]very Court of Appeals
to consider the question since Dotson has decided that because access
to DNA evidence similarly does not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’
it can be sought under Section 1983.”193  However, the Court also ac-
187. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308,
2318–19 (2009) (explaining how the State tried to distinguish Dotson).
188. Brief for Petitioners at 19, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6).
189. Brief for the Respondent at 21, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6).
190. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) (establishing that § 1983 cannot
be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement, but provides a separate vehicle
for a prisoner seeking to challenge the conditions of his confinement).
191. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318 (citing Brief for the Respondent, supra note 189, at 21); R
see also David A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: The Federal
Government Does Not Offer an Adequate Solution, Leaving the States to Remedy the Situation, 57
CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1263–64 (2008) (endorsing the theory that a § 1983 suit seeking
DNA testing is proper because such a suit does not necessarily lead to a direct attack on the
prisoner’s confinement).
192. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481–82 (1994) (stating when a prisoner can-
not use § 1983).
193. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318 (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005));
id. (citing McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 103 n.15 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v. Lyons, 469
F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006)).  The Eleventh Circuit also held similarly in Bradley v. Pryor,
305 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2002).  Following the Preiser and Heck decisions, the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits each held that a suit seeking post-conviction access to
evidence for DNA testing to challenge a conviction is not cognizable under § 1983 because
such an action is equivalent to a direct attack on the conviction. See supra text accompany-
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knowledged the State’s argument that “Dotson is distinguishable be-
cause the challenged procedures in that case did not affect the
ultimate ‘exercise of discretion by the parole board,’” and that “Dotson
does not set forth ‘the exclusive test for whether a prisoner may pro-
ceed under Section 1983.’”194
Whether or not Dotson presents the only test for whether a pris-
oner may seek relief under Section 1983, the State did not point to
another test that would preclude Osborne from so proceeding.195  Al-
though the State argued that the challenged procedures in Dotson
would not affect the ultimate exercise of discretion by the parole
board,196 presumably because the prisoners challenged the constitu-
tionality of the procedures themselves, Osborne, too, challenged the
procedures that have resulted in a denial of access to evidence.197 Dot-
son suggests that Osborne has a cognizable Section 1983 claim be-
cause, like the prisoner challenging parole-eligibility hearing
procedures whose successful suit could at most lead to a new parole
hearing, Osborne’s suit, if successful, would at most have supplied him
with evidence and would not necessarily have invalidated his
conviction.198
Had the Court recognized Section 1983 as an avenue to seek
post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing, it would not have
violated the principles of comity and federalism protected by Preiser
ing note 101.  These decisions came before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dotson, however, R
and the decisions of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits were likely a reaction to that
decision.  Eric Despotes, Comment, The Evidentiary Watershed: Recognizing a Post-Conviction
Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
821, 834–35 (2009).
194. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318–19 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, supra note 188, at 32). R
195. According to the State, Dotson sets forth only that “a § 1983 action is barred if suc-
cess in that action would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement[; i]t does not say
that a § 1983 action is barred only if success in the action would necessarily imply the inva-
lidity of confinement.”  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 188, at 32–33 (citing Dotson, 544 R
U.S. at 81–82).  The State did not explain what other test barred Osborne’s § 1983 claim,
however, relying instead on factual differences among the cases and policy arguments de-
rived from its interpretation of the purpose underlying the bar. Id. at 32.
196. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318–19.
197. Id. at 2315.
198. In Dotson, the Court held that the prisoner’s challenge to the constitutionality of
state parole procedures was cognizable under § 1983, since, if successful, the suit would
lead to a new parole hearing, rather than to earlier release from custody, and thus would
not necessarily lead to the prisoner’s release.  544 U.S. at 82.  Even if the prisoner’s suit
would put him in a better position to launch future attacks on his conviction or sentence,
he could proceed under § 1983. Id.  This approach should be extended to lawsuits seeking
DNA testing, such as Osborne’s. See Schumacher, supra note 191, at 1264 (finding that R
Dotson “strongly suggests that the use of § 1983 suits to obtain DNA testing is proper be-
cause such suits do not necessarily lead to any direct attack on imprisonment”).
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and Heck.  Underlying the Preiser Court’s limitation on claims cogniza-
ble under Section 1983 was the principle that a state prisoner should
exhaust state remedies before seeking federal relief.199  Because pro-
ceeding under habeas requires a prisoner to first exhaust state reme-
dies, the Court’s requirement that a prisoner who wishes to invalidate
her conviction proceed under habeas ensures that a federal court will
not invalidate a state court conviction without the state having the op-
portunity to first pass on the matter.200  As the Dotson Court explained,
allowing petitioners who seek only to challenge the conditions of their
confinement, rather than their conviction, to sue under Section 1983
would not contravene principles of comity and federalism:
[E]arlier cases . . . have already placed the States’ important
comity considerations in the balance, weighed them against
the competing need to vindicate federal rights without ex-
haustion, and concluded that prisoners may bring their
claims without fully exhausting state-court remedies so long
as their suits, if established, would not necessarily invalidate
state-imposed confinement.201
In other words, challenges to the conditions of a prisoner’s confine-
ment do not implicate the overturning of a state court conviction, and
such claims thus may be brought under the less stringent avenue of
Section 1983 without unduly impeding upon state court judgments.202
B. The Court Properly Invoked the Medina Standard for Review of
Alaska’s Post-Conviction Procedures, but the Court Should
Have Seriously Considered Whether the Procedures As
Applied Violated the Medina Standard
The Court, recognizing that Osborne had a liberty interest in ac-
cess to the post-conviction procedures provided by the State,203 ex-
amined the procedures under the standard articulated in Medina v.
199. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1973).
200. See id. at 489 (“Congress has passed a more specific act [the federal habeas corpus
statute] to cover the situation, and, in doing so, has provided that a state prisoner challeng-
ing his conviction must first seek relief in a state forum, if a state remedy is available.  It is
clear to us that the result must be the same in the case of a state prisoner’s challenge to the
fact or duration of his confinement, based, as here, upon the alleged unconstitutionality of
state administrative action.  Such a challenge is just as close to the core of habeas corpus as
an attack on the prisoner’s conviction, for it goes directly to the constitutionality of his
physical confinement itself . . . .”).
201. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 84.
202. Id.
203. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319
(2009).
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California,204 which dictates that a federal court may upset state post-
conviction procedures only if they “offend[ ] some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental,” or “transgress[ ] any recognized principle of
fundamental fairness in operation.”205  While the Court has applied
the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge206 to review chal-
lenged state procedures under due process claims, it has emphasized
that the deferential Medina standard is appropriate for the review of
state rules of criminal procedure.207  The Alaska statute at issue208 is
more akin to a state rule of criminal procedure than to the policies to
which the Court has applied a version of the Mathews balancing test,
which include a parole revocation policy,209 a policy governing the
restoration of good-time credits,210 and a policy governing placement
in supermax prisons.211  These policies fall further outside the ambit
of the criminal process than does the Alaska statute governing post-
conviction procedure.  The Court’s deferential review of Alaska’s post-
conviction statute thus fell in line with precedent.212
In applying the Medina standard to hold that Alaska’s post-convic-
tion procedures were adequate, however, the Court improperly sup-
204. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
205. Id. at 446, 448 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
206. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
207. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443–46.
208. ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020 (2008).
209. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480–81 (1972).
210. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974).
211. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005).  The Court has applied the
Medina test to a statute governing the time limit for filing new trial motions and, prior to
Medina, the Court applied a similar standard to the state law governing appointment of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406–08 (1993);
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987).  In Medina, the Court applied the test
in reviewing a statute allocating the burden of proof in a competency hearing.  505 U.S. at
445–48.  The Court explained that the statute fell within the criminal process, although
“[t]here are significant differences between a claim of incompetence and a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity.” Id. at 448.  Where the statute governing the competency pro-
ceeding fell within the category of a state rule of criminal procedure for purposes of apply-
ing the Medina standard, it is probable that Alaska’s statute governing state post-conviction
procedure would as well. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010.
212. See Tung Yin, Comment, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a
Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 446–47 (1995)
(explaining that a due process challenge to sentencing procedures would likely be ex-
amined under Medina, and noting that the Medina standard is appropriate to the criminal
realm because its “more narrow inquiry intrude[s] less on states’ extensive expertise in and
common-law traditions of criminal procedure”). But see McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89,
107 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the Mathews test is the proper framework to evaluate re-
quests for post-conviction access to evidence); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 315 n.6 (4th
Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the Ma-
thews test should be applied in the case of claims to access evidence post-conviction).
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ported its conclusion that Osborne failed to follow Section 12.72 of
the Alaska statute.  First, the Court relied upon the state court’s find-
ing that Osborne had failed to seek a form of testing unavailable at
the time of trial, as required by the post-conviction statute.213  It ap-
pears that Osborne sought STR DNA and mitochondrial DNA
(“mtDNA”) testing in his petitions for access to the DNA evidence,214
however, neither of which were available during his trial, and the State
apparently conceded as much.215
Second, the Court appeared to also rest its due process holding
on Osborne’s failure to exhaust the state procedures.216  The Court
noted that Osborne sought federal relief while the state proceedings
were ongoing, and found that he could not criticize the manner in
which the state procedures worked in practice when he had not fully
used them.217  As Justices Stevens and Souter each asserted in their
dissents, however, Osborne did seek relief under Alaska’s procedures
prior to filing his Section 1983 suit.218  Further, even if Osborne “side-
213. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308,
2321 (2009) (“When Osborne did request DNA testing in state court, he sought RFLP
testing that had been available at trial, not the STR testing he now seeks, and the state
court relied on that fact in denying him testing under Alaska law.” (citing Osborne v. State,
163 P.3d 973, 984 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007); Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 992 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2005))).
214. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the
Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1123 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Opening Brief of
Appellant Osborne at 6, 12, 20–21, Osborne, 110 P.3d 986 (No. A-8399).
215. See Osborne, 521 F.3d at 1123 n.2 (“The State’s concessions that the RFLP DNA
testing available pre-trial is ‘not quite as discriminating as’ the STR and mitochondrial
DNA testing Osborne now seeks, and that these methods were not available pre-trial, is an
apparent reversal of the State’s representation to the state court . . . .”); see also Brief of
Appellee at 21, Osborne, 110 P.3d 986 (No. A-8399) (explaining how the superior court
denied Osborne’s request that the evidence be retested with methods “that were unavailable
at the time of Osborne’s trial” (emphasis added)).
216. The Court’s apparent basis for upholding the procedures—that Osborne had not
fully used them because he interrupted state proceedings by filing his § 1983 suit—is tanta-
mount to mandating exhaustion of state procedures. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (major-
ity opinion) (“His attempt to sidestep state process through a new federal lawsuit puts
Osborne in a very awkward position.  If he simply seeks the DNA through the State’s discov-
ery procedures, he might well get it.  If he does not, it may be for a perfectly adequate
reason, just as the federal statute and all state statutes impose conditions and limits on
access to DNA evidence.  It is difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when Osborne has
not invoked them.  This is not to say that Osborne must exhaust state-law remedies . . . .
But it is Osborne’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of the state-law procedures avail-
able to him in state post-conviction relief.”); see also Myrna S. Raeder, Postconviction Claims
of Innocence, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 14, 17 (“The majority also faulted Osborne for
shortcutting Alaska’s remedies by filing the section 1983 action, which it found defeated
his ability to claim that they did not work in practice.”).
217. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321.
218. See id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Osborne made full use of available state
procedures in his efforts to secure access to evidence for DNA testing . . . .  He was rebuffed
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step[ped the] state process,”219 exhaustion of state procedures is not
required of a Section 1983 claimant.220
The Court should not have dismissed Osborne’s due process
challenge of the State’s post-conviction procedures based on the mis-
conception that he failed to seek new testing.221  Further, the Court
should not have faulted Osborne for filing his federal claim before
awaiting the results of his appeals in the Alaska court system when
exhaustion of state remedies is not required in bringing a Sec-
tion 1983 claim.222  The Court claimed that the Medina standard was
satisfied, as the procedures did not offend some fundamental princi-
ple of justice or transgress some fundamental fairness;223 however, in
light of the Alaska courts’ arbitrary denial of relief, the Court should
have seriously considered the possibility that Alaska’s application of
Section 12.72 violated Medina.
at every turn.”); id. at 2342 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Alaska has presented no good reasons
even on its own terms for denying Osborne the access to the evidence he seeks, and the
inexplicable failure of the State to provide an effective procedure is enough to show a need
for a § 1983 remedy, and relief in this case.”).  Only upon being denied relief by the Alaska
Superior Court did Osborne file suit in federal court under § 1983. See Osborne, 521 F.3d at
1124–25.
219. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (majority opinion).
220. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005) (explaining that “prisoners may
bring their claims without fully exhausting state-court remedies so long as their suits, if
established, would not necessarily invalidate state-imposed confinement”); see also
Despotes, supra note 193, at 824 (“A § 1983 plaintiff can bypass the state courts and pro- R
ceed directly to federal court; he is not required, as in habeas proceedings, to exhaust
other state remedies before a federal court can hear his § 1983 action.” (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1973))).  The Court itself posits that it is not reasonable
to require a § 1983 petitioner to exhaust state procedures, yet this is precisely the grounds
upon which the Court faults Osborne. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (“This is not to say
that Osborne must exhaust state-law remedies. . . .  But it is Osborne’s burden to demon-
strate the inadequacy of the state-law procedures available to him in state postconviction
relief. . . .  These procedures are adequate on their face, and without trying them, Osborne
can hardly complain that they do not work in practice.” (citations omitted)).  Osborne
sought relief under the state post-conviction statute, and when he was denied, he pursued
federal relief. Id. at 2314–15.  The Court appeared to equate this fact with Osborne “not
invok[ing]” the State’s procedures. See id. at 2321.
221. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. R
222. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text. R
223. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (explaining the Medina test and then stating that the
Court “see[s] nothing inadequate about the procedures”).
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C. Had the Court Recognized Section 1983 and Subjected the State Post-
Conviction Procedures to Meaningful Due Process Review, It
Could Have Achieved the Right Policy Balance, Provided
Notice to Prisoners, and Lent Adequate Guidance to
Lower Courts
The Court should have decided the important Section 1983 ques-
tion and reached the issue of whether Alaska’s procedures violated
due process in practice.  This natural extension of the Court’s prece-
dent is not only warranted under the circumstances of the case,224 but
would have aligned with the Court’s policy objectives and provided
significantly greater guidance to prisoners and courts as the rapidly
growing area of DNA technology develops.
Recognition of a post-conviction right to seek access to evidence
for DNA testing under Section 1983 would promote fairness and jus-
tice in a variety of ways.  It would provide prisoners with an avenue to
access evidence material to their guilt or innocence, which is impor-
tant to state prisoners in light of the many procedural limitations on
seeking federal habeas relief.225  Ultimately, the Court recognized the
vital interest of a defendant in a fair criminal process.226  Providing a
separate avenue for a prisoner to seek access to evidence, particularly
where the alternative avenue is often time-barred,227 furthers the
Court’s interests in truth-seeking and fairness.228
Additionally, conducting meaningful review of state post-convic-
tion procedures when their application is challenged on procedural
due process grounds would further important policy objectives.  While
the deferential Medina standard accords due weight to the freedom of
the states in designing criminal procedure,229 application of the stan-
224. See supra Part IV.A.
225. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489 (detailing the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement);
Schumacher, supra note 191, at 1250 (same); see also Despotes, supra note 193, at 823 (de- R
tailing the stringent time limitations and the requirement of showing actual innocence);
Raeder, supra note 216, at 20–21 (same). R
226. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2323 (explaining that the criminal justice system has histor-
ically accommodated new types of evidence and respected individual rights).
227. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. R
228. See Despotes, supra note 193, at 823–24 (advocating the recognition of a constitu- R
tional right to access evidence post-conviction for DNA testing under § 1983).  While the
Court has also expressed concerns that recognition of rights to access evidence for DNA
testing could be costly for the court system, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2323, solutions exist to
alleviate this concern.  For example, cost-shifting is possible, the mechanisms of which are
already incorporated in many state DNA procedures. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§ 8-201(h) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that the petitioner shall pay the costs of testing,
although the court shall pay if the results are favorable to the petitioner).
229. See supra Part II.C.
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dard must allow for genuine review of state procedures in order to
further the Court’s interest in ensuring justice and fundamental fair-
ness.  The prospect of meaningful federal review would encourage
states to perform their procedures fairly.230
Moreover, the Court’s determination on these two issues would
have provided notice to prisoners and better guidance to lower courts.
Had the Court ruled on the Section 1983 issue, it would have resolved
the circuit split over the proper avenue for such claims, pre-empting
further debate over the meaning of Dotson for petitioners seeking
post-conviction access to evidence.231  Had the Court properly ana-
lyzed the fairness of Alaska’s post-conviction procedures as applied in
this case, its opinion would have both assured prisoners of their rights
to access state post-conviction procedures, where they are provided,
and held states accountable for the fairness of their procedures.232
These considerations have become increasingly significant as DNA
technology continues to develop and as the issue of access to evidence
for DNA testing emerges as a national issue of criminal justice.233
V. CONCLUSION
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, the
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that a state prisoner’s claim
to a due process right to access evidence could be pursued under Sec-
tion 1983, and held that Alaska’s post-conviction procedures did not
violate the prisoner’s due process rights when the prisoner did not
230. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (explaining that where a State
recognizes a right, due process requires it to provide an effective procedure for accessing
relief under that scheme); see also Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1, 27 (1997) (discussing the importance of federal review in the context of a habeas
claim: “The failure to correct errors found in post-trial review sends the message that con-
stitutional violations are inconsequential.  It tells judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement
officials that departures from constitutional standards in the quest for convictions and
death sentences will be tolerated.  The short shrift that the Supreme Court, Congress, and
the President have given habeas corpus reaffirms the notion voiced so often by politicians:
that the Bill of Rights is nothing more than a collection of ‘technicalities’ that get in the
way of convicting the accused and carrying out their sentences.  The underlying assump-
tion, of course, is that because those accused are guilty, the denial of process does not
matter.”); Daniel J. Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO
ST. L.J. 273, 274 (1983) (emphasizing the importance of meaningful federal review of state
criminal cases to ensure observance of the Constitution).
231. See supra Parts II.B, IV.A.
232. See supra Part II.A (discussing a prisoner’s liberty interest in access to post-convic-
tion procedures where they are provided).
233. The increasing importance of DNA testing is evidenced by the fact that the federal
government and at least forty-six states have procedures in place for accessing evidence for
DNA testing. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316.
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make full use of those procedures before pursuing a Section 1983
claim.234  In so holding, the Court disappointed prisoners and courts
in two respects.  First, the Court left them to wonder whether claims to
access DNA evidence may properly be brought under Section 1983.235
Second, it failed to provide clear guidance on the process due to pris-
oners who attempt to use state post-conviction procedures to seek
such evidence.236  The Court could have defined the right to access
evidence for DNA testing and rendered a decision consistent with pre-
cedent by deciding the important Section 1983 question and con-
ducting a meaningful procedural due process review of Alaska’s post-
conviction procedures.237  Doing so would have furthered policies of
truth-seeking and fairness, provided notice to prisoners, and defined
the contours of this important issue for the benefit of both defendants
and courts.238
234. Id. at 2319, 2321.
235. See supra Part IV.A.
236. See supra Part IV.B–C.
237. See supra Part IV.A–B.
238. See supra Part IV.C.
